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In many metropolitan areas throughout the United States, a group of mortgage lenders 
active in the market post a set of mortgage lending terms each week in a local newspaper.  Casual 
inspection of these postings over time suggests that some lenders usually advertise low rates 
relative to the market mean, while others tend to be above market.  Furthermore, at any point in 
time, the distribution of posted rates appears to vary considerably.  Why do lenders post the rates 
we see advertised, how frequently do they adjust the terms, and how does the market respond'? 
In this paper, we discuss how lenders might use posted lending terms to signal 1) their 
eagerness to take new loan applications and 2) their lending standards relative to other lenders in 
their market.  We demonstrate that lenders who lower their posted rates relative to their own 
normal market position indeed attract more applicants.  We also find that better quality applicants 
are more likely to apply to low-rate lenders and that these lenders tend to sell off a larger portion 
of the loans they originate, to apply less stringent underwriting standards, and to deny fewer loan 
applications than do middle- or high-rate lenders.  In our sample, the low-ratepow-risk lenders 
tend to be independent mortgage banks or the mortgage subsidiaries of commercial banks and 
thrifts.  The high-ratehigh-risk lenders tend to be commercial banks and thrifts.  These lenders 
may be playing different roles in their respective markets. 
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In many metropolitan areas throughout the United States, a group of mortgage lenders 
active in the market post a set of mortgage lending terms each week in a local newspaper.  The 
rates are listed in a manner designed to permit an easy comparison of discount points and note 
rates by credit shoppers in the market.  Casual inspection of these postings over time suggests that 
some lenders usually advertise low rates relative to the market mean, while others tend to be 
above market.  Furthermore, at any point in time, the distribution of posted rates appears to vary 
considerably. 
Why do lenders post the rates we see advertised, how frequently do they adjust the terms, 
and how does the market respond?  In addressing these questions, we view lenders as using 
posted rates to signal their desired current position in the market to potential borrowers. 
Specifically, we think that lenders are trying to accomplish two objectives with their posted rate 
practices.  First, lenders move their rates relative to the market mean in order to affect the flow of 
mortgage loan applications they might receive.  Their purpose is to attract or discourage 
applicants based on adjustments they desire to make in their loan portfolios.  Second, we 
conjecture that lenders tend to specialize in evaluating loan applicants of different quality types, 
and that they use posted rates to signal the quality type sought. This signaling activity would not 
be necessary in an economy characterized by perfect information. However, it is likely that 
several imperfections are manifest in actual markets.  To cite just one example, if potential 
borrowers do not know the underwriting standards of each lender, and if the search is costly for 
both parties, then a set of posted rates may lead to more efficient matches. 
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mortgage lenders active in Cleveland, Columbus, and Detroit during 1990, 1991, and 1992. The 
lenders consist of commercial banks, savings and loans, mortgage subsidiaries of depository 
financial institutions, and independent mortgage banks.  A second data source, obtained from 
lenders under provisions of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), contains information 
about mortgage loan applicants to these lenders during this same period.  We use the HMDA data 
to construct a measure of the applicant quality attracted by each lender for which we have rate 
data. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In section D, we describe the mortgage lending terms 
data, the applications data, and sample design.  In section III, we report the distribution of lending 
rates in the markets examined.  Section IV considers the role of posted rates as switches used by 
lenders to regulate their application flows, and section V investigates the role of posted rates as 
signals of the type of loan quality a lender seeks.  Our conclusions and suggestions for further 
research are presented in section VI. 
D.  DATA 
Mortgage Loan Application and Disposition Data 
Information used to calculate mortgage loan application and disposition rates for 
individual lenders in the three cities examined was drawn from data collected under the 1989 
revisions to HMDA.  Nearly all commercial banks, savings and loans, credit unions, and other 
mortgage lending institutions that have an office in a Me~opolitan  Statistical Area (MSA) are 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmrequired to report annually on each mortgage loan application received.  Lenders must provide 
such information as loan amount,  census tract of the property, loan guarantee (conventional, 
Federal Housing Administration [FHA], or Department of Veterans Affairs [VA]), loan 
disposition, race and gender of the applicant, and applicant income.'  This study utilizes home 
purchase loan filings for the Cleveland, Columbus, and Detroit MSAs during 1990, 199  1, and 
1992. 
Raw HMDA data provided direct information on the denial rate (percentage of loan 
applications that were not approved by the lender), total number of loan applications, and 
percentage of loan applications taken from minority (non-white) applicants for each lender.  These 
variables could be summed over applicants to provide a measure of the monthly activity of each 
sample lender. Information on the quality of loan applicants and the lender's underwriting 
standard, however, could not be gathered so straightforwardly. We derived these variables using 
the predictions of a model estimated with the entire HMDA dataset, including lenders outside the 
three MSAs.  The model was developed as follows. 
We assumed that each individual mortgage application's risk could be represented as a 
function of the applicant's characteristics (such as race and income), neighborhood (census tract), 
market (MSA), and lender. Moreover, we assumed that the probability of an application being 
denied is linear in its risk.  This implies that the probability of a random loan application being 
denied is also linear, i.e., 
1 See Canner and Smith (1991,1992) for a comprehensive discussion of  HMDA. 
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tract is denied, and zero otherwise.  MSA, TRACT, and LENDER are dummy variables indicating 
which MSA, census tract, and lender the application relates to, and e is a residual.  AC is a vector 
of application characteristics reported in the HMDA data, including, race, marital status, 
occupancy, income, loan amount, income-to-loan ratio, federal loan guarantee (FHA or VA), and 
month of the year the application was acted upon.' 
HMDA data for home purchase loan originations were used to fit model (1) separately for 
1990, 199  1, and 1992.~  Although the basic model form is linear, we used splines and interaction 
terms to reflect potential nonlinearities. The actual estimation was done in two steps.  In the first 
step, equation (1) was estimated with the individual application characteristics (AC) and separate 
intercepts for each lenderlcensus tract combination included as single-component  fixed effects. In 
the second step, an iterative procedure, equivalent to regressing the fixed-effects intercepts 
against MS A, census tract, and lender dummies, was used to identify the MS A, tract, and lender 
effects.  Separate lender effects were estimated for each MSA, in effect defining lenders operating 
in multiple MSAs as multiple  lender^.^ 
Alternative specifications such as a logistic or probit model could have been employed: There is no 
particular theoretical reason to choose among these forms.  Thus, the practical dictates of a very 
large sample led to the choice of the linear probability specification. 
a Samples for each year included all home purchase loan applications for 1-4 family residential units 
acted upon (accepted or denied) by the lenders. This included 1,984,688 applications in 1990, 
2,087,470 in 1991, and 2,400,875 in 1992.  In a small number of  cases, some values for certain 
variables had to be imputed because they were not reported by the lender. 
By construction, the MSA effects were normalized to have overall sample means of zero; within 
each MSA, lender and tract means were also normalized to zero.  In cases where lender and tract 
effects were not identified (a lender was the only lender in a tract and did all of its business there), 
the effect was assigned to the tract. 
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applications received (AC, MSA, and TRACT), to predict denial rates on the basis of all factors 
except lender.'  This prediction, averaged over all applicants to a lender in a month, was used as a 
measure of applicant quality.  We estimated the lender's underwriting standard as the difference 
between its denial rate for the month and the estimated quality of its applicants.  If this residual 
was positive, for example, it would indicate that the lender denied more applicants than would be 
predicted that month, indicative of a tough underwriting standard.  A negative residual would 
indicate a looser standard. 
Interest-Rate Data 
Interest-rate data were collected from National Mortgage Weekly, a firm that telephones 
lenders for pricing information which it then provides to newspapers to publish in their real estate 
sections each week.  The firm selects lenders that account for a large volume of loans in their 
markets and asks for prices on a variety of mortgage loan products.  National Mortgage Weekly 
provided us with information on each of their weekly reportings for the 36 months spanning 
1990-92 for the Cleveland, Columbus, and Detroit markets.  We used the middle week of each 
month as representative of the month and focused on one product, 30-year fixed-rate 10ans.~ 
Quoted interest rates were adjusted for lender points, with each point equaling a 114 percent 
higher loan rate. 
Parameter estimates for these regressions are not presented here because of space considerations. 
They are available in Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman (1994a). 
Clearly, this may be a biased estimate of a lender's true pricing position, since some lenders may 
not make fixed-rate loans or may prefer to steer borrowers away from fixed-rate products. 
Unfortunately, only the  first-year rate was reported for variable-rate mortgages, whereas the 
spread over the index would have been a more accurate measure of price.  Since many firms offered 
first-year "teasers" on variable-rate products, it was hard to compare the true prices of variable-rate 
loans across lenders.  For this reason, we decided to use only the fixed-rate price. 
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Unfortunately, the HMDA and National Mortgage Weekly samples did not mesh exactly. 
In some cases, banks and savings and loans filed separate HMDA reports for their mortgage bank 
subsidiaries, but may have posted only one rate for National Mortgage Weekly.  In these cases, 
the HMDA filings were consolidated. In other cases, lenders were not large enough to be 
included in the price survey, but still filed HMDA reports.  Somewhat inexplicably, price 
information was sometimes reported for lenders who did not file HMDA reports (perhaps because 
the market definition used by National Mortgage Weekly did not correspond exactly to the MSA 
definition). In these cases, the lenders were not used.  There were also a number of instances of 
lenders being included in both data samples, but for only part of the study period.  Since we were 
interested in long-run behavior, we decided to eliminate all lenders that did not provide price 
information for at least the first 24 months of the sample period or that didn't file HMDA reports 
for at least 1990 and 199  1. 
III.  PATTERNS OF POSTED RATES IN OUR SAMPLE OF LENDERS 
We hypothesize that lenders post interest rates to send two types of signals to borrowers. 
First, lenders may differ in the amount of risk they are willing to assume and may use posted rates 
to signal the market of their willingness to accept risk.  Second, from one month to the next, 
individual lenders may find that they are in a position to make more or fewer loans, in which case 
they may use posted rates to signal their willingness to accept loan applicants.  We assume that 
lenders consistently posting high rates relative to the market are signaling that they are willing to 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmaccept more risky loans than lenders that consistently post below-market rates.  We consider the 
market rate to be the median interest rate advertised each month in each metropolitan area by our 
sample of lenders.  Each lender's median deviation from the market rate is considered to be its 
long-term position in the market, which we assume to be a signal of its underlying type.  Most of 
the lenders in our sample (7 1 out of 87) posted rates that are within 118 point of the median rate 
in their market for the majority of the 24 months covered. However, eight of the lenders posted 
rates that were more than 118 point above the market for the majority of the months, and another 
eight posted rates that were more than 118 point below.  All eight high-rate lenders are 
depository institutions (either commercial banks or thrifts), whereas only one of the low-rate 
lenders is a depository institution, three are subsidiaries of depository institutions, and four are 
independent mortgage banks. 
In  addition to using posted rates to signal their long-term position in the market, lenders 
may vary their posted rates relative to their long-term position to signal their intention to accept 
loan applications.  Some lenders tend to move above or below their long-term positions for 
extended periods, while others shift positions for relatively short durations. We use the number of 
runs to describe the length of time that a lender shifts its position relative to the market.  A 
complete run extends from the time a lender moves above or below its long-term position to the 
time it shifts from being above (below) to being below (above) its long-term position.  Forty 
lenders in our sample had so few runs that we can reject the hypothesis that their short-term 
interest-rate changes are random (see table 1).  These lenders tend to shift rates relative to their 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmlong-term position infrequently and thus have prolonged periods when they are above or below 
their long-term position.7 
In addition to the length of time above or below their median position, lenders differ in the 
magnitude of their rate changes relative to their long-term position.  Some lenders tend to post 
large changes in rates, while others post relatively small changes when they do shift from their 
long-term position.  We use the absolute value of non-zero deviations from each lender's long- 
term position to capture this sort of variation across lenders in the magnitude of short-term rate 
changes.  In table 1, lenders with a mean absolute deviation greater than 118 point are classified 
as high variance lenders, while those with a mean absolute deviation below that are classified as 
low variance lenders. 
Table 2 reports the cross-classification of lendefs by both measures of short-term shifts in 
posted rates.  Forty percent of the lenders in our sample change relative position often, and the 
magnitude of these changes is relatively small; 13.7 percent make frequent, large shifts in posted 
rates; 28.7 percent make infrequent, small changes in their relative position; and the remaining 
17.2 percent make infrequent, large changes in their relative position. 
IV.  POSTED RATES AS SIGNALS OF LENDERS' WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT LOAN 
APPLICATIONS 
In a typical month, the majority of lenders advertise rates that are within 118 point of the 
median rate posted in their market (see column 1 of table 3).  However, almost 45 percent of 
'The  probability that the number of  runs is random is calculated following Gibbons (1971).  We  classify 
the lender as  systematic in its shifks of posted rates if we  can reject the null hypothesis of  randomness at 
the 5 percent confidence level. 
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typical month, 16 percent advertise rates that are at least 218  point above or below the median. 
This diversity of advertised rates suggests that lenders may be using their postings to signal the 
market.  One hypothesis is that when lenders want to increase the size of their mortgage 
portfolio, they advertise rates that are lower than their normal market position.  Borrowers 
respond to the signal, and total applications to the lenders rise.  The change in the quantity, and 
possibly the quality, of the loan applications received, coupled with lenders' desire to increase the 
size of their loan portfolios, may also mean a change in underwriting standards.  As a result, 
lenders' overall denial rates may also change. 
In this section, we consider the relationship between short-term changes in posted rates 
and four aspects of mortgage lending:  total number of applications a lender receives, quality of 
these applications, standards used in evaluating the applications, and overall denial rates.  To 
examine these relationships, we estimate the following: 
(2)  Yit = ai  Li + g~  Mm + b~Rit  + eit. 
Yit is a measure of mortgage lending activity for lender i in month t.  The four measures of 
mortgage lending activity considered are 1) total applications received, 2) the predicted denial 
rate, which is used as a measure of the quality of loan applications received, 3) the difference 
between actual and predicted denial rates, which is used as a measure of the standards being used 
to evaluate loan applications, and 4) the actual denial rate.  Rit is a vector of dummy variables 
indicating the difference between lender i's posted interest rate in month i and the median interest 
rate advertised in month i by lenders in the metropolitan area.  Nine categories are included that 
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category.  Li  is a vector of dummy variables for each lender, included to control for normal 
mortgage lending activity and deviation from the market rate, and M,  is a vector of dummy 
variables for each metropolitan area M in month t, included to control for marketwide changes in 
mortgage lending activity and interest rates.  The applications regression is estimated using 
ordinary least squares;  all other regressions are estimated using weighted least squares, where the 
weights are the number of applications received. 
Parameter estimates for the interest-rate variables in equation (2) are presented in table 3. 
Since these regressions control for lender-specific and market/month-specific effects, these 
coefficients can be interpreted as the change in a lender's monthly application flows, denial rates, 
quality of applications, or lending standards that is associated with a change in the lender's relative 
position in the market, as measured by its deviation from the median market rate. 
Our estimates are largely consistent with the argument that lenders use posted rates to 
signal their willingness to accept loan applications and that the market responds to these signals. 
Application flows increase significantly when lenders lower their advertised rates relative to their 
normal position in the market.  The point estimates indicate that the elasticity of applications with 
respect to the posted rate is quite high:  Applications increase by  about 20 percent for every 118 
point reduction in posted rates relative to the lender's normal market position.  Applications also 
decrease when lenders raise their posted rates relative to their normal position.  However, the 
change in applications is relatively small and is significant only when the rate is 118 to 218 point 
above the normal position. 
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changes in posted rates.  Our estimates indicate that quality increases when lenders lower their 
posted rates relative to the market and to their normal position in the market.  The quality of loan 
applications also falls off when posted rates rise, suggesting that when a lender increases its 
posted rates, only those applicants with the least probability of acceptance continue to apply. 
It also appears that the underwriting standards applied to loan applications change when 
lenders alter their posted rates, particularly when the new rates are 218 to 318 point above or 
below the market, given their normal position relative to the market.  When lenders lower their 
rates, the gap between their actual denial rate and their predicted denial rate shrinks, indicating 
that for a given quality of loan application, lenders are denying fewer loans and hence are 
lowering their acceptance standards.  This behavior is consistent with lenders dropping their rates 
to augment the size of their loan portfolios.  Similarly, when lenders raise their rates 218 to 318 
point above the market, given their normal position, their denial rates increase relative to the 
quality of applications received, indicating that their acceptance standards are higher. 
Finally, we find that actual denial rates rise when lenders increase their posted interest 
rates and fall when lenders decrease their rates.  Again, this effect is significant only if rates are 
218 to 318 point above or below the market. 
In summary, when lenders lower (raise) their rates relative to their normal position in the 
market, they also tend to lower (raise) their acceptance standards. These two effects work in the 
same direction in regard to application flow: The number of applications received increases 
(decreases) when lenders lower (raise) their posted rates relative to their normal position in the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmmarket.  These findings are consistent with lenders using short-term changes in posted rates to 
signal the market of  their intention to accept more or fewer loan applications, and the market 
responds to these signals.  Interestingly, the average quality of applications received increases 
when lenders post lower rates and decreases when lenders post higher rates, though it is not 
immediately obvious why this should be true.  One would expect that lowering interest rates and 
acceptance standards would increase applications from both high- and low-risk applicants, and 
that increasing rates should reduce applications from both groups.  From our results, it appears 
that the relatively low-risk applicants are more sensitive to changes in posted rates. 
V.  POSTED RATES AS SIGNALS OF LENDERS' WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT RISK 
In addition to using posted rates to signal their desire to increase or decrease the size of 
their loan portfolios, lenders may use this channel to signal their willingness to accept risk.  If the 
market is composed of high-risk and low-risk lenders, lenders may use posted interest rates to 
signal to borrowers which type they represent.  As discussed in section TI, we consider high-rate 
lenders to be those with posted rates that are more than 118 point above the market for the 
majority of the 24 months in our sample, and low-rate lenders to be those with posted rates that 
are more than 118 point below.  In our sample, we identify eight high-rate and eight low-rate 
lenders. 
Table 4 presents mean characteristics for high-, middle-, and low-rate lenders in our 
sample.  The first panel presents the means weighted by the number of applications received by 
each lender.  The entries in the first row indicate that 3.48 percent of all applications received by 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmlow-rate lenders were rejected, compared with 9.98 percent of those received by high-rate 
lenders.  In the bottom panel, the lender, rather than the application, is the unit of  analysis used in 
calculating the means.  The entries in the first row indicate that the average denial rate for low- 
rate lenders is 5.98 percent, compared with 13.24 percent for high-rate lenders.  The difference 
between the means for lowlmiddle- and middlehigh-rate lenders, and F-tests of the significance of 
these differences, are presented in table 5. 
Our estimates are largely consistent with the argument that lenders use posted rates to 
signal the market of  their willingness to accept risk, and that the market is responding to these 
signals: The quality of applications received by the low-ratellow-risk lenders is significantly 
higher than for the middle- or high-rate lenders.  Beyond this, low-rate lenders tend to sell off a 
larger portion of  the loans they originate, to apply less stringent underwriting standards, and to 
deny fewer loan applications than middle- or high-rate lenders.  In general, differences between 
low-rate and middle-rate lenders appear to be considerably larger and more significant than 
differences between middle- and high-rate lenders. 
Since our classification of lenders as high or low rate is somewhat arbitrary, we also 
examine the correlation between lenders' median deviation from the market rate and various 
measures of mortgage lending activity. These correlations are presented in table 6.  The simple 
correlations, presented in the first column, are consistent with the differences in means presented 
in tables 4 and 5.  The quality of loan applications is lower for high-rate lenders.  Ln  addition, 
these lenders tend to have higher denial rates, high loan acceptance standards, and a greater 
number of loans held in their portfolios than do low-rate lenders. 
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(either commercial banks or thrifts), while the low-rate lenders are either mortgage subsidiaries of 
banks and thrifts or independent mortgage banks.  It may be that these different types of 
institutions generally service different types of customers and apply different standards in 
evaluating loan applications, independent of any variations across them in their advertised interest 
rates.'  The second column of table 6 presents partial correlations between lenders' median 
deviation from the market rate and our measures of lending activity, controlling for the type of 
institution.  These partial correlations indicate that the differences related to posted rates that 
were observed across all lenders are not due solely to differences in institutional type.  Even after 
controlling for type of institution, high-rate lenders have higher denial rates, lower average quality 
of applications, and higher loan acceptance standards.  The only difference that seems to be 
related solely to differences in institutional type is the percentage of loans sold. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The mortgage lending market has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years amid 
allegations that lenders are underserving some neighborhoods and allowing race to enter the 
lending decision.  We investigate neither issue in this paper.  However, in previous work (Avery, 
Beeson, and Sniderman [1993a, 1993b, and 1994b1) on these topics, we argue that the behavior 
of both lenders and borrowers needs to be analyzed more carefully to truly understand the 
 his finding is consistent with results reported by Benjamin, Heuson, and Sirmans (1994) from a 
sample of South Florida mortgage lenders. 
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direction. 
In this paper, we discuss how lenders might use posted lending terms to signal both their 
eagerness to accept new loan applications and their lending standards relative to other lenders in 
their market.  We demonstrate that lenders who lower their posted rates relative to their own 
normal market position indeed attract more applicants. At the same time, lenders who lower their 
rates also appear to loosen their credit standards, which should reinforce that pattern. 
We also find that better quality applicants are more likely to apply to low-rate lenders and 
that these lenders tend to sell off a larger portion of the loans they originate, to apply less 
stringent underwriting standards, and to deny fewer loan applications than do middle- or high-rate 
lenders.  In our sample, the low-ratebow-risk lenders are generally independent mortgage banks 
and the mortgage subsidiaries of commercial banks and thrifts.  The high-ratelhigh-risk lenders 
tend to be commercial banks and thrifts.  These lenders may be playing different roles in their 
respective markets. 
To our knowledge, this paper is the only empirical examination of interest rates as signals 
in the mortgage lending market.  If a dataset such as HMDA could be assembled that also 
included the actual credit terms of loan applications, many interesting questions could be 
explored. One issue is the extent to which posted rates accurately signal a lender's transaction 
prices.  Another line of research would be the development of matching models to gauge more 
precisely how the price of credit is related to credit risk in this market. 
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Commercial Banks  Mortgage Subs of  Independent  Total 
and Thrifts  Banks and Thrifts  Mortgage Banks 
Median Deviation from Market 
Rate 
High (+ 118 point or more)  8 
Mid (-118 to +1/8 point)  42 
Low  (-118 point or more)  1 
Shifts in Relative Market 
Position 
Systematic (prolonged) shifts  23 
Random (frequent) shifts  28 
Variance of Deviation from 
Market Rate 
Low  (average absolute 
deviation < 118 point)  33 
High (average absolute 
deviation > 118 point)  18 
Total  5  1  19  17  87 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Source:  Authors' calculations. 
Low Variance 
(average absolute deviation 
< 118  point) 
Percent of lenders 
High Variance 
(average absolute deviation 
> 118  point) 
Percent of lenders 












clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3:  Relationship between Month-to-Month Changes in Posted Interest Rates and Application 
Flows, Quality of Loan Applications, Lender Standards, and Denial Rates 
1 Regressions include dummy variables for each lender and for each month*MSA combination. 
Note:  (standard errors) "  " indicate significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels of confidence, 
respectively. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Deviation from Market Median 
More than 318  point above 
218  to 318  point above 
118 to 218  point above 
0 to 118 point above 
0 
0 to 118 point below 
118 to 218  point below 
218  to 318  point below 
More than 318 point below 
R~ 
Mean of dependent variable 





































































































clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4:  Mean Application Characteristics by Long-term Market Position (High-, Middle-, 
and Low-Rate Lenders) 
- 
Weighted by Number of Applicants: 
Low-Rate  Middle-Rate  High-Rate 
Actual denial rate 
Predicted denial rate 
Actual-predicted denial rate 
Percent of loans sold 
Percent minority applicants 
Unweighted: 
Actual denial rate 
Predicted denial rate 
Actual-predicted denial rate 
Percent of loans sold 
Percent minority applicants 
Average number of applicants 
Number of lenders 
Low-Rate  Middle-Rate  High-Rate 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5:  Differences in Means across Lender Types 
Actual denial rate 
Predicted denial rate 
Weighted  Unweig  hted 
Middle-  High-  Middle-  High- 
Low  Middle  Low  Middle 
Actual-predicted denial rate  3.45 
(1.1227) 
Percent of loans sold 
Percent minority applicants  0.2 1 
(0.0087) 
Average number of applicants 
* Indicates means are significantly different at the 10 percent level of confidence.  F-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 6:  Correlations between Application Characteristics and Lenders' Median Deviation 
from the Market Interest Rate 
Correlation Coefficients 
Simple Correlation  Partial - Controlling 
Coefficient  for Lender ~ype' 
Actual denial rate  0.2764*  0.3143" 
Predicted denial rate  0.2493"  0.221 l* 
Actual-predicted denial rate  0.243 1  *  0.2956* 
Percent of  loans sold  -0.4748*  -0.1013 
Percent minority applicants  -0.1529  -0.0464 
Average number of applicants  0.0 1.54  -0.0834 
* Indicates significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of confidence. 
'  Commercial bank or thrift, subsidiary of  a commercial bank or thrift, and independent mortgage bank. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm